A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation by Robertson, Elbert L.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 49 
Issue 3 Spring 2000 Article 4 
2000 
A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation 
Elbert L. Robertson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 741 (2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
A CORRECTIVE JUSTICE THEORY OF
ANTITRUST REGULATION
Elbert L. Robertson*
This Article argues for an alternative perspective on antitrust injury
and liability. The goal is to analyze the nature of wrongful conduct as de-
fined in this distinctly economic policy oriented area of law. Following
this analysis, this Article proposes a theoretical alternative to dominant
and conventional economic, efficiency-based theories that effectively
limit antitrust sanctions and generally restrict marketplace regulation.
To the extent coercive or unfair business behavior by individuals appears
anticompetitive and generates civil and criminal antitrust penalties, this
Article argues that an alternative philosophical tradition that is not es-
sentially economic in nature better explains and justifies compensatory
sanctions. The alternative theory is called corrective justice. It is an an-
cient principle that establishes a normative standard for balancing the
general rights and duties of individuals in society.
This Article focuses on the use of classical corrective justice principles
as an explanation for per se rules that categorically prohibit concerted
and unilateral business activity that unfairly injures economic competi-
tors. The argument traces the devolution of the per se doctrine and the
rise of efficiency based "rule of reason" standards. Corrective justice
would require an adherence to per se rules where unfair practices disrupt
the competitive process regardless of efficiency concerns. This practice
contradicts the modern trend that focuses exclusively on consumer wel-
fare maximization at the expense of fairness to individual business com-
petitors. Part I presents the primary argument for the classical principle
of corrective justice in the context of contemporary antitrust doctrine.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A. 1980, Brown Univ.;
J.D. 1989, Columbia Law School; M.A. 1992, Wharton School/University of Pennsylvania.
The basic ideas in this Article have been presented at workshops and symposia including
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Boston College Law School and the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern
University. I am grateful to many colleagues and friends who have participated in sub-
stantive discussions of the theme and commented on earlier drafts, especially Vincent
Blasi, Karen Blum, Eric Blumenson, Peter Carstensen, Peter Donovan, James Hackney,
Russell Hardin, Keith Hy~ton, Thomas Kleven, Anthony Polito, and Jeffery Atik. Helpful
editorial assistance and encouragement was also provided by J. Cunyon Gordon, Matthew
Kipp, James Reppetti, and Aviam Soifer. Rafiq A1-Shabazz, Tara Hall, and Robert Bren-
nan provided valuable research assistance.
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The argument draws primarily on two types of antitrust problems to il-
lustrate how the corrective principle explains antitrust regulation in a
manner superior to conventional, efficiency-based welfare economic
analysis. The first type of problem focuses on the continuing viability of
the per se rule in the context of section 1 Sherman Act litigation.
Part II also extends the corrective justice approach to antitrust issues
involving trade associations, and explores its application to anticompeti-
tive uses of certification and standardization processes. Concerted trade
association activity involving certification and standardization often
serves as a coercive basis for securing unwilling competitors' participa-
tion in price-fixing schemes. These cases show how industry standards
are sometimes either rigged to injure competitors unfairly or serve as
barriers preventing prospective entry into particular markets. This Arti-
cle discusses these problems in the context of the evolving status of the
per se rule as it relates to harmful concerted activity that would be com-
pensable under a system of corrective justice. While Part II focuses pri-
marily on certification and standardization cases, it also presents impor-
tant cases that do not involve technical standards and certification to
illustrate further the doctrinal impact of the devolution of the per se rule.
Part III explores a second type of problem related to the "rule of rea-
son" alternative to per se analysis. This Part discusses how even under a
rule of reason analysis unilateral acts intentionally designed to injure
competitors are necessarily compensable under the principle of correc-
tive justice. Part III examines the content and evolution of the law of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act to argue for the cor-
rective justice norm. This Part draws parallels to the common law tort of
unfair competition with an emphasis on the role of anticompetitive "in-
tent." Recognizing the distinct features of tort remedies, Part III argues
for a derivative corrective justice rule that provides a basis for statutory
remedies in the context of the broader goals of antitrust policy. Finally,
Part IV examines coercive effects of tie-in arrangements and vertical
constraints from a corrective justice perspective in contrast to an effi-
ciency-based welfare-maximizing rule. In conclusion, this Article argues
that corrective justice provides a principled basis for statutory compensa-
tion for antitrust injuries stemming from substantively unfair economic
behavior despite the restrictive pro "efficiency" bias that dominates con-
temporary antitrust jurisprudence.
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND CONTEMPORARY
ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
A. The Aristotelian Version of Corrective Justice
The principle of corrective justice has classical roots that date back two
thousand years.' Despite their classical origins in the thought of Aris-
totle, the core ideas of social justice articulated in the Nichomachean
Ethics remain the seminal basis for most operational systems of justice in
contemporary western societies. For Aristotle, it was important first to
distinguish between two fundamental conceptions of justice as a social
institution. He described the two concepts as "universal justice" and
"particular justice."2 Aristotle characterized justice in general as "the
whole of virtue."3 In his scheme, "universal justice" as an independent
concept represents the highest social virtue.4 John Rawls characterized
this idealized conception of justice as the "first virtue" of social institu-
tions.5 On the other hand, Aristotle introduces "particular" justice as a
much narrower conception of justice. Particular justice is the ideal ethi-
cal standard for distributing material goods in society.6 Idealized par-
ticular justice then divides into "distributive justice" and "corrective jus-
tice."
, 7
To Aristotle, distributive justice is an algorithmic virtue, a rule for
fairly allocating goods and wealth among members of society.8 Society
ought to allocate goods according to a moral baseline of well-defined
merit.9 The practical effects of distributive justice are considered to be
social solidarity and social stability. Hence, society allocates goods ac-
cording to that social rule that best effectuates the basic purposes of the
1. See ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 179
n.2 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1976). In Thomson's translation, the
term "rectificatory" is substituted for its linguistic equivalent "corrective." See id. Despite
this somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of the original Greek, I prefer this text because
it offers the most lucid of contemporary English translations. Most translations use the
term "corrective justice"; however, in recent translations the term "restorative" is gaining
currency as an alternative to both "corrective" and "rectificatory." See also ARISTOTLE,
THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 109 (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1963) (continuing to use the term "rectificatory").
2. See ARISTOTLE (Thomson trans.), supra note 1, at 175.
3. Id. at 173 (quoting a proverb attributed to both Theognis and Phocylides).
4. See id. at 173-74.
5. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 586 (1971).
6. See ARISTOTLE (Thomson trans.), supra note 1, at 175.
7. See id. at 176-77.
8. See id. at 177-79.
9. See id. at 178.
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polity. In this sense, Aristotle's conception of distributive justice would
be welfare maximizing. The definitive test of a "just" allocative rule is
that its resulting allocations are proportionate to a primary social value.
For example, under a communist scheme of distributive justice, society
would allocate goods in proportion to need because communism is not a
meritocracy and individual human need is a primary social value.
Distributive justice as defined by Aristotle arguably is a proper con-
cern for antitrust analysis.' ° Monopoly redistributes wealth and con-
sumer surplus away from purchasers in a manner inconsistent with the
welfare-maximizing rule requiring that price equal marginal cost. Where
the distortional effect, however, is evaluated a posteriori, distributive jus-
tice pursuant to a welfare maximizing rule cannot resolve a compensa-
tion claim. It also fails to provide an independent basis for determining
whether the gains of a monopolist were wrongful or inconsistent with
practices and procedures that recognize other primary social values, i.e.,
merit, need, or fairness. Finally, it provides no basis for determining the
amount of compensation a monopolist must pay.
Corrective justice in control does much more than merely protect the
status quo by following a proportionality algorithm. Corrective justice is
primarily restorative. It serves to correct for any distortions in the allo-
cative scheme previously established by a system of distributive justice.1'
Distributive justice corrects for allocative inequities before the estab-
lishment of a social rule that regulates exchanges. Corrective justice ap-
plies after the rules of social interaction have been laid down and are al-
ready appreciated as binding on social agents. Aristotle believed that
society should enact corrective justice as a principle independent of any
particular distributive concerns.
In Book V of his Nichomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle wrote:
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a
bad one or vice versa, nor whether a good man or a bad man
has committed adultery; all that the law considers is the differ-
ence caused by the injury; and it treats the parties as equals,
only asking whether one has committed and the other suffered
an injustice, or whether one has inflicted and the other suffered
a hurt.12
10. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) (arguing that distributive justice is the primary value behind
the consumer welfare maximization orientation of contemporary efficiency focused anti-
trust doctrine).
11. See ARISTOTLE (Thomson trans.), supra note 1, at 179-81.
12. Id. at 180.
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This is a profound statement of how corrective justice disregards the
relative position of the agent. It requires compensation for wrongdoing
regardless of the prior social or economic position of the parties. Fur-
thermore, the principle of corrective justice disregards considerations of
the impact of just reallocations on third parties.
The Aristotelian notion of corrective justice is completely compatible
with the end of promoting equitable results when disputes arise regard-
ing discrete transactions between individuals. 3 The moral basis for a cor-
rective justice approach that requires compensation for injuries caused
by coercion, fraud, or theft is highly intuitive. When there is an allega-
tion of a wrongful dispossession of something of value, corrective justice
serves as a principle that promotes the equitable resolution of the ag-
grieved parties' complaint by mandating restitution in fair proportion to
the loss.
The nature of the alleged injury (trespass, breach of contract, or inten-
tional tort) and the manner of the harm (coercion, theft, or fraud) are in-
dispensable elements for establishing the baseline for equitable relief.
The actual baseline established suggests society's evaluation and disfavor
of certain types of transactional behavior (e.g., violence, duress, or
fraud).14 If society can utilize the principle of corrective justice to pro-
mote equity in disputes between individuals, then utilizing the principle
to vindicate public policy through state action is also logical. Nothing in
the Aristotelian conception of corrective justice implies that only private
actions, "either tort suits or suits for breach of contract satisfy the reme-
dial demands of corrective justice."'5 The behavioral norms of society es-
tablish grounds for legal liability. For example, societal sanctioning of
fraudulent and coercive exchanges help establish the basis for compen-
sating fraud and extortion victims.
B. Antitrust and Economic Theory: The Argument for Corrective Justice
Given the inherent economic nature of antitrust policy, it is not sur-
prising that at the core of contemporary antitrust decision-making is the
neoclassical economic model and its distinct rhetoric. Modern economic
theory provides the paradigm in the search for a coherent methodologi-
cal approach to analyzing legal rules and institutions. Drawing upon
conceptions that postulate man as a rationally self-interested maximizer
of perceived interests, economic theory allows for the conversion of its
13. See id. at 179-81.
14. See id. at 175 (attributing the gain from certain offenses solely to injustice).
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 315-16 (1990).
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behavioral propositions into a powerful tool for explaining law as a social
institution. Jurists and commentators have broadly incorporated an eco-
nomic methodology providing both a positive and normative foundation
for legal discourse in diverse areas of legal decisions. One of the most
economically laden areas of the law is found in contemporary antitrust
doctrine. Both direct judicial reference and legislative policymaking have
infused antitrust analysis with the method and rhetoric of neoclassical
economics.
The consensual goal of our national antitrust policy is both implicitly
and explicitly economic in a variety of its stated objectives. These in-
clude (1) the maximization of consumer welfare, (2) economic efficiency,
(3) the equitable diffusion of economic and political power, (4) facilitat-
ing the clearing of dysfunctional markets, (5) facilitating entry into mar-
kets by eliminating illegal barriers, and (6) the protection of competitors
with relatively limited market power. 6 Predominant contemporary eco-
nomic theories of antitrust claim that the exclusive goals of antitrust pol-
icy should be: (1) welfare maximization; and (2) allocative efficiency.
In describing the primacy of the efficiency-based approach to antitrust
policy, Robert Bork states that "the whole task of antitrust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without im-
pairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a
net loss to consumer welfare.""
The primary argument, however, for utilizing the principle of correc-
tive justice is premised on a rejection of this narrow, hegemonic charac-
terization of the goals of antitrust policy. An efficiency-based view that
characterizes the "whole" purpose of antitrust as minimizing consumer
prices or maximizing consumer welfare ignores the impact of normative
rules. This Article presents an analysis of the evolution of antitrust case
law, attempting to balance the social welfare goals embodied in the anti-
trust statutes with fundamental norms of reasonable and decent behav-
ior, making market processes possible.
The central tenet of antitrust law is the preser~ation of competition be-
tween various sellers of a given good or commodity in the most desirable
form of economic organization. Though monopoly may exist as the natu-
ral consequence of limited resources or fixed property rights, it is still dis-
favored. Commentators often say, however, that some form of illegal
conduct is required and that the objection is to the process of monopoli-
16. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW §§ lle-
f, 112b-c (rev. ed. 1997).
17. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 91 (1978).
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zation rather than to the state of monopoly itself.18 Courts have deemed
the wrongful act of intentionally exercising an unfair advantage in order
to promote monopoly to be highly objectionable. 9 Notwithstanding this
qualification, however, monopoly -a situation with an exclusive seller in
a given market-remains a highly undesirable form of economic organi-
zation. 0 Monopoly is undesirable because the unfair power held by the
monopolist allows him or her to subvert competition by exploiting con-
sumers and harming competitors. Yet, where there are many sellers and
many buyers, no seller asserts any control over price, and each enjoys the
ability to sell as much at the market price as he desires. If price is equal
to marginal cost, producers and sellers will make and sell only those units
of a given product that should be made and sold. The competitive proc-
ess monitors overproduction and underproduction, which in turn rests
upon the self-interested decision making of individuals. The general
message is clear and consistent whether we state the proposition in terms
of efficiency, wealth, consumer welfare, or utility."
The monopoly model stands in sharp opposition to perfect competi-
tion. Here the existence of the single profit-maximizing seller in the
market ensures that production will be reduced to a point where price
exceeds marginal cost. All units that are made should be made, but some
units are not made that could be made. As gains from trade are left un-
exploited, society can no longer regard the situation as optimal. Under
conventional welfare analysis, social loss is equal to the welfare triangle
that assumes that most of the increased costs to those buyers that remain
in the market are simply a transfer payment to the monopoly seller.2
A contract between competing sellers to fix the price of their products
(or to limit their output) is an agreement that is most often injurious to
consumers. When a single firm dominates a market and undertakes con-
duct designed to preserve its monopoly position, it potentially injures
would-be competitors through effective monopolization. Section 2 of the
18. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,429 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. See id.
20. For a straight economic approach to the antitrust laws, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). Judge Learned Hand, the author
of the Aluminum Co. of America opinion, stated that certain other elements might lie be-
hind the adoption of these laws, in particular the organization of an industry with small
firms in direct competition with each other, or the destruction of the "great aggregations
of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them." Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d at 428-29.
21. See BORK, supra note 17, at 107 (adopting the consumer welfare standard).
22. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-
offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
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Sherman Act condemns monopolization. 2' The monopolist's efficiency
gains can readily injure competitors. In many cases, such injury cannot
be considered harmful to competition per se, especially where efficiency-
enhancing monopolization promotes overall economic welfare. When a
monopolist or the conspiratorial behavior of oligopolists results in injury
to would-be competitors because of unfair behavior (e.g., conspiracies),
courts often find such behavior per se illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.24 One may find classic examples of per se illegal behavior
that is essentially coercive in nature in the case law involving concerted
refusals to deal.
C. The Application of Corrective Justice to Contemporary Antitrust
Policy
Unlike a general economic behavioral theory of social policy, the goal
of corrective justice is not to attain a social optimum to maximize either
wealth or aggregate utility. The goal of corrective justice is to provide
equity whenever coercive, fraudulent, or grossly unfair acts wrongfully
injure individuals. Therefore, explicit economic justifications for sanc-
tions seeking to promote economic welfare through antitrust legislation
often may conflict with corrective justice principles. For example, per se
prohibitions of business practices associated with antitrust injuries forbid
many behaviors that might enhance efficiency or maximize overall con-
sumer welfare. In such cases, the per se rule makes little economic sense
to those who hold that allocative efficiency is the exclusive goal of anti-
trust policy. From the perspective of the injured party, though, correc-
tive justice requires compensation consistent with a baseline rule pro-
moting fair economic competition. Applied in the context of antitrust
disputes, the ultimate goal of this approach is to promote procedural jus-
tice in market relationships. This Article primarily focuses on a regula-
tory ideal regarding transactions between competitors, not on its welfare
effect on consumers and other third parties.
A complete theory of corrective justice is inherently individualistic in
orientation. Corrective justice is superior to efficiency-based theories
because it provides equitable remedies for wrongful injuries regardless of
the relative economic position of the parties. The rectificatory (or cor-
rective) 2 principle focuses on fairness to persons because conventional
welfare analysis often fails to provide a coherent theory of just economic
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
25. For a discussion of the use of the term "rectificatory," see supra note 1.
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institutional relations in the context of antitrust disputes. This principle
can best generate social rules establishing norms of fair behavior and
compensation consistent with the public policy goals expressed in the
federal antitrust laws.
Contemporary legal scholarship illustrates the attractiveness of correc-
tive justice as a special ideal. There is an emerging trend favoring the
corrective justice approach to analyzing legal rules and sanctions. This
Article follows the mode of corrective justice analysis made famous by
Professor Richard Epstein in his seminal 1979 law review article entitled
Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints.26 This
work spawned a significant, growing body of legal literature emphasizing
how the corrective justice norm is a powerful tool in analyzing the foun-
dations of legal decisions in the areas of torts, property, and contract.
The predominant scholarly application of corrective justice principles has
been in tort theory. 7
To appreciate the breadth of a corrective justice analysis, it is neces-
sary to understand how foundational principles link the common law of
property, torts, and contracts. These distinct areas of law are function-
ally linked in the determination of a just behavioral baseline that extends
to all agents participating in exchanges or transactions of legal signifi-
cance. The law of property, for example, establishes the prerequisites for
ownership and acquisition. The law of contract follows the establishment
of ownership rights through property rules and signifies the means
through which society legitimizes the exchange of property. Finally, tort
law protects the rights of persons to physical integrity and private owner-
ship without undue interference through coercion, violence, fraud, or
negligent acts. It is at this level that the three predominant forms of the
common law reflect a baseline of right and wrong behavior by individu-
als. The private common law provides a broad category of compensatory
remedies for harms stemming from untenable business practices called
unfair competition torts. These actions include damages and equitable
injunctions for fraud, misrepresentations, patent and trademark in-
26. Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
27. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, in
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 184 (1988) (providing excellent discussions of the cor-
rective justice norm); Posner, supra note 15, at ch. 11 (same); Richard A. Posner, The
Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187
(1981) (same); Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justifi-
cation for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. LAW REV. 2348 (1990) (same). See also generally
Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbors,
77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
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fringement, and tortious interference with contractual relations. Where
such wrongful behavior has moral content that is repugnant to society, it
is often criminalized. Wrongful economic behavior that transgresses
deeply held societal notions of the duties of honesty and fair play may
result in strict personal punishment to the transgressor.
The same regulative ideal that sanctions coercive and unfair business
behavior in the private common law is implicit in the public policy goals
embodied by the federal antitrust statutes. The adoption of corrective
justice principles similarly would require compensation for harms stem-
ming from such wrongful acts in the context of public law. For example,
corrective justice principles would require public law prohibitions and
sanctions for unfair trade practices. The absolute behavioral restrictions
expressed by antitrust per se rules represent non-consequentialist correc-
tive justice norms conflicting with the wealth maximizing rules favored in
conventional law and economic analysis.29
The federal antitrust laws as conceived and originally drafted neces-
sarily embody corrective justice principles. In fact, Congress expressly
acted to eliminate unfair trade practices by empowering the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce section 5 of the FTC Act which has
specific though inadequate corrective features.30 The method of en-
forcement by the FTC consists of injunctive relief in the form of "cease
and desist" orders. The goal is to correct the problem through the cessa-
tion of the harmful act. From the Aristotelian perspective of corrective
justice, this remedy is inadequate because it offers no mandatory com-
pensation or restitution to the victim of the wrongful trade practice. Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, however, allows for both treble damages and
attorney's fees for any private plaintiff who can prove injury to his busi-
ness or property as a direct result of an antitrust violation." The criminal
28. See Robert H. Lande, Welath Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69 (1982). In a
seminal article challenging the Chicago School thesis that economic efficiency was the ex-
clusive legislative purpose of the Sherman Act, Prof. Lande argued that the Antitrust stat-
utes were passed primarily to prevent the "unfair" acquisition of consumer wealth by firms
with market power. See id.
29. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 925 (1979) (noting that the predominant conventional law and economics
paradigm is the "Chicago School" of antitrust analysis).
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). This raises the obvious question about whether
treble damages for antitrust injuries are consistent with corrective justice's basic require-
ments for equivalent compensation. I agree with Professor Robert Lande's position that
treble damages merely approximate the actual economic value of losses sustained by vic-
tims of Sherman and Clayton Act violations, generally understating the loss. See generally
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provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act entail prison sentences
and fines for violators that can equal $10,000,000.32
While this Article does not deny that some commentators view correc-
tive justice as an important value in antitrust remedies, the primacy of ef-
ficiency-based welfare analysis presently overshadows the theories' con-
temporary importance as a behavioral regulative ideal. This Article
presents an extended argument for reinterpreting the statutory and deci-
sional rules that form the corpus of contemporary antitrust doctrine in a
manner that will require compensation for all injuries to competitors re-
sulting from substantively unfair and monopolistic trade practices. The
narrow and hegemonic focus on "efficiency" as touted in conventional
"Chicago School" doctrine, while paradigmatically dominant, fails to
value or secure necessary conditions of social morality and procedural
fairness required for any competitive market to function.33
Central to the theme of corrective justice is the moral concept of fair-
ness. The concept of fairness is essential to Aristotle's overall theory of
general justice. Aristotle wrote:
Let us begin, then, by taking the various senses in which a man
is said to be unjust. Well, the word is considered to describe
both one who breaks the law and one who takes advantage of
another, i.e. acts unfairly. Then evidently also both the law-
abiding man and the fair man will be just. So just means lawful
and fair; and unjust means both unlawful and unfair.34
The prohibition of unfair trade practice is arguably an essential feature
of antitrust policy.35 In general, fairness requires that society treat per-
sons equally in the context of their circumstances." Unfair behavior un-
der the Aristotelian conception would be relevant where one firm, be-
cause of its monopoly position "takes advantage of another."37 The term
"unfair" applies easily to a broad range of transactions that could be in-
Robert H. Lande, Are Antritrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 115 (1993). I thank Professor Keith Hylton for raising this objection.
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
33. While contemporary scholarship suggests we have entered a Post Chicago School
Era, its efficiency orientation still permeates antitrust doctrine. See Michael S. Jacobs, An
Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 222
(1995).
34. ARISTOTLE (Thomson trans.), supra note 1, at 172.
35. See generally Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means
and Why It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265 (1994).
36. See generally T.M. Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and Fairness, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MORALITY 93 (Stuart Hampshire ed. 1978). Here, the author develops a rule-utilitarian
theory of fairness that serves as a moral guarantee of procedural equality and consistent
respect for individual rights regardless of short term social utility.
37. ARISTOTLE (Thomson trans.), supra note 1, at 172.
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jurious to competitors. Harms stemming from such behavior would have
to be distinguishable from accepted forms of competitive injury. For ex-
ample, "conspiracy" is a morally pejorative term that implies wrongdo-
ing. It suggests an agreement to do a harm made in a manner that un-
fairly disadvantages the victim.
Fairness as a conceptual basis for corrective justice remedies serves as
a limit on opportunistic and strategic behavior by market participants.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act explicitly prohibits all conspiracies in re-
straint of trade.3 9 Antitrust regulation categorically prohibits conspirato-
rial behavior." Evidence of its existence generates per se condemnation.
This is an excellent example in the context of antitrust legislation of how
a moral norm that disparages various types of behavior because of sub-
stantive unfairness matches the rule of law. It also presupposes, how-
ever, that conspiratorial behavior is distinguishable from normal com-
petitive processes. The imposition of these prohibitions in order to
promote competition completely denies any premise holding that compe-
tition is exclusively the end product of totally amoral autonomous acts by
market participants. Rather, in determining acceptable competitive acts,
one must evaluate the moral quality of the actions of market participantsby ... . 41
by including substantive fairness.
Along with conspiratorial behavior, society has long deemed coercion
incompatible with free market decision-making. Antitrust regulation
also prohibits coercion. Unlike conspiracies, however, economic coer-
cion has been difficult to distinguish from the normal consequences of
competitive processes in all but extreme cases. Where firms have signifi-
cant market power in the context of monopoly, forbidding coercive uses
of that power becomes a central element of antitrust policy making. Sub-
stantive fairness, again, requires restraining monopolies from injuring
would-be competitors through coercive devices aimed at solidifying their
38. See generally, Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of
Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AMER L. & ECON. REv. 63, 66 (1999). Kaplow and
Shavell argue that endorsing a notion of fairness in evaluating a legal rule will, in some
cases, limit the well-being of everyone by eliminating Pareto improvements in a symmetri-
cally sub-optimal manner.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
40. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1990)
(Justice Douglas in the famous footnote 59 states that where horizontal competitors have
combined for the conspiratorial purpose of fixing prices and act in furtherance of that con-
spiracy, it is not necessary to prove sufficient market power to effectuate the scheme in
order to find a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
41. See generally JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 53-59 (1992). Coleman ar-
gues that the concept of competition presupposes fair cooperation between market par-
ticipants. See id. at 59-62.
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market superiority. In their seminal text, Antitrust Policy: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, Professors Kaysen and Turner wrote:
Forbidding the use of unfair tactics as a means of acquiring mo-
nopoly power has of course been an important element in anti-
trust policy. Nevertheless, this description of the problem is to
some extent superficial. If a firm can coerce rivals, suppliers, or
customers, there must be some reservoir of force on which it
draws that accounts for the acquiescence of the coerced party in
a situation that, by definition, is not the result of mutually free
bargaining.
They also went on to define economic coercion as the ultimate result
of the unfair use of market power by dominant firms. They write:
Typically, then, coercion consists in the ability of a firm with
market power to impose terms in a bargain, which the other
party would refuse, were there an alternative transactor with
whom he could deal more advantageously. The normal instru-
ments of business bargaining, delays, refusals to deal, represen-
tations which fall short of complete candor ... can be turned
uniformly to the advantage of the powerful bargainer, because
his partner in the transaction would be even worse off if he did
not accept the terms imposed. This is [ ... ] to argue that this
meaning of unfairness must be viewed as an aspect of market
power, and that if the prevention of unfair conduct is a distinct
policy aim, it must refer to the kind of characteristics of transac-
tions discussed above in terms of equal treatment of those
similarly situated.43
These comments by Kaysen and Turner are profound affirmations of
the connection between substantive fairness and the procedural goals of
modern antitrust policy. The theory of corrective justice is predicated on
the dictates of substantive fairness." To the extent that the goals of
modern antitrust policy are consistent with a vision of market partici-
pants behaving in a manner that will make the competitive process pos-
sible, the theory of corrective justice best serves that vision.
Two antitrust cases provide excellent examples of judicial attempts to
reconcile the need for sanctioning grossly unfair behavior by competitors
with concerns for preserving efficient results. In Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-
42. CARL KAYSEN AND DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 16-17 (1959).
43. Id. at 17.
44. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Corrective Justice and Corporate Tort Liability, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (1996). Prof. Wells argues that corrective justice requires a sub-
stantive moral theory of fairness in either a Kantian or pragmatic formulation.
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Hale Stores, Inc.,45 the plaintiff owned a small appliance store located
close to the defendant's larger store and alleged that the defendant util-
ized its superior market power to force manufacturers not to deal with
him, to the total detriment of his business. The defendant did not deny
these allegations. Instead, he sought and won summary judgment. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that Klor's had stated a proper cause
of action under the per se rule 6 The Court stressed that there were
classes of restraints, which both common law and statute forbade by their
very nature or character.47 This was true even if the disfavored behavior
did not affect "the opportunities for customers to buy in a competitive
market."
48
The Court's analysis in Klor's is entirely consistent with a corrective
justice requirement that, had the plaintiff been guilty of conduct that
wrongfully harmed the defendant, compensation would be mandatory
regardless of its general effect on the marketplace. The Klor's court de-
signed its rule to be a regulative ideal that categorically forbids conduct
found intrinsically anticompetitive. More important, the Court's refer-
ence to restrictions or conduct that are an enduring part of the common
law evokes an analogy to longstanding unfair competition torts. Com-
mon law torts provide legal and equitable remedies for false advertising,
tortious interference with contract relations, and misappropriation of
trade secrets.
In Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp.,49 the Court
found that a conspiracy intentionally to injure a competitor through un-
fair tortious behavior-in this case hiring away employees to obtain trade
secrets-was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.0 The
court held that it was not necessary to show a successful restraint of trade
where there was proof of a conspiracy to utilize an unfair trade practice
for anticompetitive purposes.5
Largely, courts disfavor the rule of Albert Pick-Barth. The Fifth Cir-
cuit has indirectly overruled it. 2 One can directly attribute the demise of
this case as doctrine to the rise of economic formalism, in which effi-
45. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
46. See id. at 210-14.
47. Seeid. at 211.
48. Id. at 210.
49. 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1932).
50. See id. at 101-03.
51. See id.
52. See Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir.
1978) (indirectly overruling Albert-Pick v. Barth for being too "vague").
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ciency concerns and market for wrongful behavior endure in the com-
petitive process. Increasingly with the rise of efficiency-based economic
formalism, the explicit recognition of how "unfair competition" gener-
ates section 1 Sherman Act violations under a per se standard has de-
volved. The case of Deauville Corp. v. Federated Department Stores,
Inc. 3 provides a good example of how current judicial emphasis on com-
petition as an economically wealth maximizing process has immunized
substantively unfair devices from effective antitrust regulation. In Deau-
ville, the plaintiff, a shopping center developer, sued a competing devel-
oper for allegedly using acts of unfair competition to induce a key anchor
tenant into backing out of a project under development by the plaintiff.
The court held that, standing alone, acts of unfair competition that would
violate the state common law do not trigger a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, even if the violation stems from willful or wantonly unfair
behavior. 4 Having thus rejected a per se test, the court alternatively ap-
plied the rule of reason to determine whether the plaintiff had made out
a violation of law.5" The evidence showed that numerous alternative an-
chor tenants and shopping center projects were available and would have
efficiently maximized the economic value of the plaintiff's contract.
Hence, the defendant's conduct had little, if any, effect on competition,
and therefore the court concluded:
Where a defendant uses unfair methods to eliminate a competi-
tor from the market, but does not harm competition, at most a
claim for "unfair competition" can be made out. Congress has
repeatedly declined to create a private federal law of unfair
competition .... In addition, the policies of state unfair compe-
tition laws and the federal antitrust laws are often in conflict; an
act condemned by the former need not violate the latter ....
Accordingly, we affirm the directed verdict against [the plain-
tiff] on the issue. 6
53. 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985).
54. See id. at 1192-93.
55. See id. at 1192.
56. Id. at 1192-93. Even the First Circuit, the source of the doctrine, has narrowed its
original scope significantly. That court retreated from the original Pick-Barth proposition
that conspiracies to injure a competitor through unfair methods of competition constitute
per se violations of the antitrust laws. See George R. Written, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 574, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1974). In place of the original rule, the court
adopted a more limited standard applicable only when at least one of the defendants is a
significant factor in the market. See id. at 562; see also infra Part III (discussing section 2
offenses), The more limited standard arguably shifted the analysis away from Sherman
Act section 1 and more toward a Sherman Act section 2 claim of actual or attempted mo-
nopolization or conspiring to monopolize.
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From the perspective of corrective justice, however, the wisdom of the
Pick-Barth rule is clear. If competitors are guilty of harmful behavior
that is grossly unfair and inimical to the competitive process, and if they
have used these devices in a conspiratorial manner, they violate section 1
57of the Sherman Act. Such violations require that the offender compen-
sate the victim by paying damages calibrated in a restorative manner.
The tension this Article explores is whether an act should be consid-
ered anticompetitive only when its effect is to promote an inefficient al-
location of resources (a distributive question) or might it be anticompeti-
tive in a broader sense because it violates norms of fair conduct that must
be followed if competition is to be possible. Some welfare maximizing
exercises of market power injure competitors but might promote a wel-
fare maximizing result. Should we see it as the essence of competition?
The argument for corrective justice claims that whenever market partici-
pants intentionally injure actual or potential competitors through
fraudulent, conspiratorial, or coercive means, they must pay compensa-
tion. The principle of corrective justice requires that offenders pay com-
pensation in an amount equivalent to the wrongful gain or the harmful
effects of wrongful action.
Corrective justice as a philosophical principle is compatible with the ul-
timate goals of the public law. To the extent that corrective justice re-
quires that antitrust offenders be sanctioned and disgorge any profits at-
tained through coercion, fraud, or other unfair advantages, it effectively
promotes equity and preserves fair and open economic competition.
Federal antitrust decisions utilize per se rules that categorically prohibit
behavior tending to promote the monopolization of economic resources
through unfair and coercive activity. These laws also forbid attempts at
monopolization whereby a unitary actor seeks unfairly to subvert the
competitive process in order either to attain monopoly status or to en-
hance an existing monopoly position. The law provides remedies and
sanctions for harms to persons injured by such antitrust violations.
Therefore, the federal antitrust policies and remedies are totally consis-
tent with the Aristotelian vision of corrective justice.
57. Though most courts and commentators generally have rejected the Pick-Barth
rule, many courts still hold that conspiratorial uses of unfair competition methods might
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers,
Inc. v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 594 F.2d 114-15 (5th Cir. 1979); Omark, 576 F.2d at 90.
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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II. SECTION 1 SHERMAN ACT CASES INVOLVING CONCERTED
ACTIVITY: THE DEVOLUTION OR EROSION OF THE PER SE RULE
Case law regarding the viability of the per se rule in the context of in-
dustry standardization and certification disputes is continually evolving.
The initial focus is on antitrust litigation involving concerted activity by
trade associations.
Independent trade associations perform the overwhelming majority of
industry standardization and certification processes. Trade associations
are nonprofit organizations whose members are usually competing busi-
ness firms. Committee engineers or other scientists employed by mem-
ber companies often conduct trade association programs for drafting in-
dustry standards. Most antitrust litigation regarding technical standards
and certification processes involve challenges to actions by trade associa-
tions from either association members or for other market participants
who claim economic loss due to trade association decisions.
Trade association decision-making by definition is concerted activity.
In the trade association context, courts have held consistently that con-
certed activity that has either the purpose or the effect of unreasonably
restraining trade violates the Sherman Act." Courts have also held such
behavior to violate section 5 of the FTC Act, which explicitly prohibits
unfair trade practices. 6° The primary statutory statement on the illegality
of such concerted activity is found in section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade. ' '61 The Supreme Court has not construed
section 1 to prohibit every restraint of trade, but only those "unreasona-
bly restrictive of competitive conditions," i.e., a rule of reason standard
61for such restraints, before they are condemned as illegal.
Under conventional analysis, a restraint is found unreasonable when
its harm to the competitive process outweighs its benefits. In Board of
61Trade of Chicago v. United States, for example, the court stated that
"[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 64 When a given
restraint of trade provides no competitive benefits, it is automatically
59. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1945).
60. See Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
62. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
63. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
64. Id. at 238.
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condemned.
Unreasonable restraints sometimes take the form of certification stan-
dards promulgated by a trade association, professional society, or stan-
dard-setting organization. The undesired restraint occurs when an asso-
ciation adopts a standard or practice that interferes with the competitive
functioning of the market it seeks to regulate." In American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.," the Supreme Court
recognized the potential impact that standard-setting organizations can
have on competition.67 The Court noted that standard-setting organiza-
tions "can be rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity. '" The
court held that the American Society of Mechanical Engineers was liable
for its agents' refusal to certify the safety of a competing product in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6' For certain categories of unrea-
sonable offenses, the court has adopted a per se rule of illegality. For ex-
ample, courts generally hold that group boycotts, price-fixing, and
territorial agreements are per se illegal.70
In essence, there is an artificial distinction between the process of
standardization by trade associations and concerted activity such as
group refusals to deal and economic boycotts that are forbidden as per
se. Regardless of whether a standard is performance, design, or safety
oriented, its ultimate goal is to influence purchasers not to deal with sub-
standard producers. In this sense, it harms would-be competitors who
cannot meet the standards. The courts, however, generally have held
that standardization and certification processes are inappropriate for per
se analysis in the context of legitimate trade association activity.
Although courts recognize the pro-competitive effects of industrial
self-regulation (of which certification standard development is an exam-
ple), they also recognize that much self-regulation is put into place on the
initiative of the active competitors. Therefore, courts generally utilize
the rule of reason approach rather than the per se analysis when seeking
to distinguish competitive from anticompetitive activity." In cases where
65. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218-220 (1940) (stat-
ing that the elimination of the evils of competition is not a legal justification for these prac-
tices).
66. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
67. See id. at 571.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 570-73.
70. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1967); Northern Pac. R.R.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1927).
71. See, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 128-29 (6th
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substantively unfair or coercive behavior has a harmful effect on a plain-
tiff, however, courts may still find such behavior per se unreasonable.
A. Establishing Procedural Fairness Under Section 1
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,72 the U.S. Supreme Court used
the per se rule to condemn the Exchange's exclusion of a broker from
access to its telephone system, which made it impossible for him to con-
duct transactions. 73 The Court granted that the Exchange had statutory
authority to regulate the activity of its brokers.74 In this case, however,
the Exchange presented Silver (the broker) with no explanation for his
termination and gave him no opportunity to respond.75
The Court recognized that the Exchange's self-regulatory powers gave
it immense economic power that it might use to inflict competitive injury
not justified by legitimate public policy. 76 The Court held that the Ex-
change's action was illegal because it took place "under totally unjusti-
fied circumstances., 7  The Court said that, given the principle that Ex-
change self-regulation could be justified in response to antitrust charges
only to the extent necessary to protect public policy goals, "it is clear that
no justification can be offered for self-regulation conducted without pro-
vision for some method of telling a protesting nonmember why a rule is
being invoked to harm him and allowing him to reply in explanation of
his position."78
In Silver, the Court concluded that the antitrust laws should be used to
perform the essential due process function of ensuring that self-
regulation is conducted in a fair manner and is not being used to disguise
anticompetitive purposes. 79 Though Silver is not a certification or stan-
dardization case, it is important for identifying the role that fair proce-
dures play in promoting economic competition. Silver spawned a line of
cases that helped enshrine the rule of reason as the legal standard of re-
view for "self-regulatory" decisions by private standard-setting organiza-
tions when standard setting is conducted in a non arbitrary way and the
defendant has substantial market power.80
Cir. 1980).
72. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
73. See id. at 347-49.
74. See id. at 357.
75. See id. at 361-65.
76. See id. at 359.
77. Id. at 361.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 364-66.
80. See, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.
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In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co.,81 the Supreme Court further narrowed the Silver per se rule by
holding that even an unexplained expulsion of a member of a buying co-
operative would be scrutinized under a rule of reason standard unless the
defendant association had substantial market power.82 In Northwest, the
Court said that not even all horizontal concerted refusals to deal are to
be judged under the per se rule. 3 Only those horizontal concerted refus-
als to deal that are "characteristically likely to result in predominately
anticompetitive effects" are to be judged.8' The Court denied that the
expulsion of a member from a cooperative was necessarily going to have
the requisite effects." Therefore, the Court deemed the rule of reason
appropriate. 86 For the Northwest Court, the absence of procedural safe-
guards, such as a hearing-an important focal point in the Silver opin-
ion-did not convert this refusal to deal into a per se violation. Although
a variety of factors may enter into the determination of which refusals to
deal or boycotts are likely to be so anticompetitive as to generate a per se
analysis, the two predominant factors remain substantial market power
and exclusive access to an essential facility.
B. The Contemporary Status of the Per Se Rule in Section I Certification
and Trade Association Cases
In Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute,87
the court affirmed a summary judgment against an oil rod manufacturer
who suffered economic loss due to an unexplained delay in certifying his
productY. In Consolidated Metal, the court held that when "a trade asso-
ciation that evaluates products and issues opinions, without constraining
others to follow its recommendations," it does not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act per se merely by failing to evaluate a manufacturer's prod-
uct favorably.
89
When the rule of reason is applied, courts must make some examina-
1980); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1977);
McCreevy Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (S.D. I11.
1974), affd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
81. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
82. See id. at 298.
83. See id. at 297.
84. Id. at 296.
85. See id. at 298.
86. See id.
87. 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. See id. at 286, 297.
89. See id. at 292.
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tion of the market effects of the restraint in question to determine
whether it is unreasonable. Courts have developed a series of threshold
questions to simplify this task. Judges generally ask: (i) Is the restraint
reasonably related to the achievement of a goal that is acceptable under
the antitrust laws?; (ii) Is the restraint necessary to achieve this goal or is
a less restrictive alternative available?; (iii) Do the anticompetitive terms
of the restraint outweigh its competitive benefits? 90 The first two are
threshold inquiries. Failure to satisfy either of these steps indicates that
the restraint provides no competitive benefit. The last question enables a
court to balance the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of the
restraint at issue. Such a balancing of behavior not obviously inimical to
fair competition is reasonable. Yet, such balancing is not appropriate for
grossly unfair, conspiratorial, or coercive acts.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.91 involved an
association of gas heater manufacturers and natural gas utilities (the
American Gas Association) that evaluated products that burned natural
gas." The association placed its seal of approval on those products it
judged to be safe.93 The plaintiff, a manufacturer of gas heaters was de-
nied passive approval. 94 He sued, claiming that the standards applied by
the association were arbitrary and that the harmful effect of nonapproval
was the refusal by member utilities to supply gas to facilities that used his
heater.9 The Supreme Court held that the allegation of both arbitrary
decision-making and the subsequent forced removal of the plaintiff's
product from the market were sufficient to state a cause of action for a
per se violation.96
Clearly, Radiant Burners reiterates the Court's hostility to proce-
durally unfair, arbitrary and capricious use of market power by self-
regulating entities for anticompetitive purposes. The use of unwarranted
pressure exerted by standard setters and their ability to force non-
compliers out of the market without providing an objective basis for the
exclusion satisfies all of the necessary elements for per se prohibition.
97
90. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062-63
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
91. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
92. See id. at 658.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 659-60.
97. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985); Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.
659, 360 (1961).
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In Radiant Burners, the extent of the unfairness of the action defined the
contours of the competitive process. In cases where there is no evidence
of grossly unfair activity by standard setters, the results are often quite
different. For example, in Southern Pacific Communications Co. v.
A T& T,9" the court held that the reasonable use of exclusionary practices
under the "public interest standard" of the FCC Act provided AT&T
with regulatory justification exempting it from antitrust liability.99
Merely promulgating certification standards detrimental to AT&T's
competition without evidence of unfair self-enforcement activity could
not serve as a successful basis for an antitrust claim. As in Consolidated
Metal, the ruling in Southern Pacific reflects the established principle of
law that a standard setter is never per se liable for merely issuing opin-
ions without also coercing others to follow its recommendations.
The Court restated its rationale for the per se rule in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,"°°
[t]he rationale for per se rules is in part to avoid burdensome
inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the
likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render
unjustified the cost of determining whether the particular case
at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.0 1
This cost-benefit efficiency oriented explanation of the viability and
use of the per se rule is also consistent with a conduct oriented normative
prohibition of categories of disfavored conduct. For example, where the
probability is great that a particular type of unfair behavior has occurred,
and that behavior is by definition anticompetitive (e.g., conspiracies), the
per se rule would prohibit behavior contrary to that normative standard.
The rule of reason approach to alleged section 1 Sherman Act viola-
tions has served an important role in balancing the utility of per se pro-
hibitions with the social utility of the alleged restraint. In National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n (NCAA) v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, 2 the Supreme Court considered a rule by the NCAA that set
limits on the number of television appearances its members were allowed
to make per season.' 3 The court found that this arrangement constituted
98. 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
99. See id. at 1009; see also id. at 1011 (holding that AT&T did not violate section 2 of
the Sherman Act).
100. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
101. Id. at 15-16 n.25.
102. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
103. See id. at 91-92.
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a classic price-fixing agreement.'t ' It also found, however, that per se
condemnation was "inappropriate."' 0' The Court held that the rule of
reason must be applied to this industry because agreements among com-
petitors were essential if the product was to be produced at all."°6 The
Court condemned the agreement as a violation of the horizontal price-
fixing restrictions of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but only after a rule of
reason analysis presented no competitive justification for market re-
straints.' ° It is clear, therefore, that the Court has significantly eroded
the per se standard under the predominant efficiency oriented climate of
contemporary antitrust doctrine. In cases where plaintiffs prove grossly
anticompetitive behavior, however, courts continue to apply the rule.
C. The Contemporary Status of the Per Se Rule in Section 1
Non-certification and Standardization Cases
(Horizontal and Vertical Restraints)
The ascendancy of efficiency-based erosions on per se restrictions
against arguably unfair market behavior is evidenced by the U.S. Su-
preme Court's rulings in several major vertical and horizontal cases dur-
ing the mid-1980s and early 1990s. For example, in Rothery Storage &
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc. , the Court further eroded the per se
rule as an independent behavioral standard that categorically forbids
group boycotts without regard to their efficiency. 9  The majority in
Rothery held that vertically effected group boycotts were not per se ille-
gal and that the defendant's decision to terminate an agent, where it only
controlled six percent of the market, was efficiency maximizing and
therefore immunized under the rule of reason." In this case, the relative
unfairness of the termination was irrelevant to the outcome.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,"' the
Supreme Court held that under the rule of reason certain categories of
formal agreements are unreasonable due to their coercive potential."2 In
this case, the Court found that an association of dentists that refused to
supply x-rays to insurers did not participate in a boycott that was per se
104. See id. at 95-96, 120.
105. Id. at 100.
106. See id. at 101.
107. See id. at 113-15.
108. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
109. See id. at 226-29.
110. See id. at 229-30.
111. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
112. See id. 448-49, 459, 465-66.
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illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act."3 The Court held, however,
that the horizontal agreement to withhold a particular service without
procompetitive justifications was illegal under the rule of reason. 4 The
absence of a procompetitive explanation combined with a coercive busi-
ness practice aimed at effecting price was sufficient to condemn the prac-
tice under the rule of reason. The significance of Indiana Dentists in the
context of section 1 Sherman Act decisions is that the rule of reason does
not immunize a defendant's coercive business behavior that involves
price-fixing. However, in this case, the substantive unfairness and the
unfair coercive power of the combination were found "on balance" not
to immunize the behavior. This rule of reason balancing was a retreat
from any formal per se behaviorally-based categorical prohibition.
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,"' the Su-
preme Court applied the evolving limitations on the categorical applica-
tion of the per se rule by holding that a vertical restraint on trade is not
per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act unless it contains some
agreement on price."6 In Sharp, a retailer whom the defendant manufac-
turer terminated for its pricing policies claimed its termination resulted
from an illegal agreement between the defendant and a rival retailer.117
In that case, there was insufficient evidence of a coercive agreement to
terminate the plaintiff for disfavored pricing policies."'
In Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n
(SCTLA)," 9 the Supreme Court held that an agreement by attorneys not
to accept appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants until
the District of Columbia substantially increased compensation rates was
potentially a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.12 Further,
the Court held that despite the agreement's First Amendment expressive
component, it was a horizontal boycott involving competitors, and there-
fore, a naked restraint of price and output in violation of the antitrust
laws.12' The Court rejected the appellate court's assumption that the an-
titrust laws required proof of a defendant's market power before con-
demnation could apply. 2 2 The Court reaffirmed the traditional notion
113. See id. at 453.
114. See id. at 459.
115. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
116. See id. at 724-25, 735-36.
117. See id. at 721.
118. See id. at 735-36.
119. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
120. See id. at 414, 436.
121. See id. at 436.
122. See id. at 432, 436.
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that the per se rule reflected a long-standing judgment that "[e]very such
horizontal price-fixing arrangement among competitors poses some
threat to the free market," even if the participants lack the power to con-
trol prices.'23
For the purpose of this argument, SCTLA is highly illustrative of the
Court's hostility to coercive horizontal restraints despite the defendant's
strong argument for the overall social benefits the boycott would pro-
vide. The SCTLA claimed that the purpose of its boycott was the en-
actment of long overdue favorable legislation that would maximize social
welfare by providing an adequate incentive for quality legal representa-
tion of indigents.' 24 The Court rejected this social welfare argument,
stating that "[t]he social justifications proffered for respondents' restraint
of trade thus does not make it any less unlawful. The statutory policy
underlying the Sherman Act 'precludes inquiry into the question whether
competition is good or bad.""' The majority opinion went on to quote
from Justice Douglas' famous Socony-Vacuum footnote: "Whatever eco-
nomic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to
have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They
are all banned because of their potential threat to the central nervous
system of the economy.'
126
SCTLA stands for the proposition that an inherently coercive horizon-
tal boycott designed to fix prices is never immunized from per se scru-
tiny, despite its proffered welfare benefits. This is a strong reaffirmation
of the viability of the per se rule regardless of the defendant's relative
market power whenever conspiratorial behavior is involved. The affir-
mance of the per se rule indicates that such disfavored behaviors are
found anticompetitive because of their deviation from norms of fairness
and freedom of choice that define competition.
D. The Theory of Corrective Justice Applied to Injuries Resulting from
Standard Setting, and Certification Processes Under Section 1
of the Sherman Act
There are two competing theories of value that underlie conventional
economic analysis of antitrust law. The dominant efficiency-based theo-
ries of competitive markets urge allocative efficiency, the maximization
of consumer welfare, or wealth maximization as the ultimate goal of anti-
123. Id. at 434-36.
124. See id. at 421.
125. Id. at 424.
126. Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-26
n.59 (1940)) (emphasis added).
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trust policy. The alternative theories hold that antitrust law provides a
regulatory ideal, setting a standard for permissible business behavior,
thereby promoting economic justice by protecting weaker economic enti-
ties (and consumers) from the unrestrained market power of monopo-
lists. 127 (Depending on which of these notions a judicial decision adopts,
the effective scope of antitrust injury is defined.) Subsequent rules of
compensation and sanction follow consistent with the chosen position.
Corrective justice principles belong in the latter category.
A problem with the corrective justice approach to antitrust is that as a
principle it is firmly rooted in a vision promoting a particularized regula-
tive ideal. The baseline moral rules that define just procedures also pre-
suppose a prior societal commitment to fairness in market exchange.""
Therefore, whenever unfair trade practices harm a competitor or cus-
tomer, the principle of corrective justice grants him or her due compen-
sation.
The ideal background drawn upon in the context of corrective justice
responses to antitrust injury is the same classical competitive market-
the image of a system involving a large number of firms with undifferenti-
ated products competing with each other as pure price-takers. The rules
for appropriate market behavior are basic normative directives that pro-
hibit firms from using fraud, coercion, or violence to attain a competitive
advantage. Where firms have enough market power-either singularly
as monopolists, or through concerted behavior as a functional cartel, to
behave as price setters-they may also have the power to injure other
competitors by predatory pricing or by extracting a higher than competi-
tive price from consumers."'
The nature of market competition under the ideal scheme is that the
demise of less successful competitors is inevitable. Society deems some
antitrust injuries unacceptable, however, because they stem from imper-
missible trade practices despite their efficiency-creating consequences.
Just as under the Aristotelian formula it is irrelevant whether a rich man
defrauds a poor man, it is also irrelevant from a pure corrective justice
perspective whether a small competitor unfairly injures a more powerful
127. See Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076, 1080-81 (1979).
128. See COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 53.
129. See Richard S. Markovitz, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Profes-
sor Easterbrook, 63 TEx. L. REV. 41, 80-81 (1984) (also cited in SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 435
n.17.). Professor Markovitz argues that due to market failure, a small competitor (one
without substantial market power) may be able to cause anticompetitive injury to a
stronger rival for some time.
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rival.13° These types of injuries are invariably compensable under a the-
ory of corrective justice.
When a trade association, utilizing arbitrary standards as a cover, re-
fuses to certify a competitor for refusing to engage in a price fixing
scheme, it is guilty of a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act under
the doctrine of Radiant Burners.'31 Concerted refusals to deal, designed
to punish firms that refuse to assist in fixing prices, are by definition both
unfair and anticompetitive. The rhetoric of the Supreme Court has been
somewhat misleading regarding the absolute priority of the rights of in-
dividual competitors versus the social virtues of "competition" in some
recent cases.132
The rhetorical excess of dicta that prioritizes "competition over com-
petitors" is logically untenable because without antitrust enforcement of
rules mandating fair and honest behavior between competitors, competi-
tion as a social institution would not be possible. Furthermore, the statu-
tory objectives of the Sherman Act are inconsistent with such a
hegemonic conception of fair competition. Professor Louis B. Schwartz
wrote in his 1979 symposium article "Justice" and Other Non-Economic
Goals of Antitrust:
The dogma that "antitrust laws protect competition not com-
petitors" overstates the case and ignores considerations of jus-
tice. One must amend that declaration by adding at least the
following qualification: "unless individual competitors must be
protected in the interest of preserving competition." A con-
spiracy to put a single small competitor out of business violates
the Sherman Act even if there is no showing of significant im-
pact on competition generally. In the Robinson-Patman Act,
Congress explicitly extended the anti-discrimination ban to at-
tempts to eliminate "a competitor" as well as to cases of im-
pairment of competition. But [these cases] may be seen as a
congressional concern for a non-economic goal: "justice," in the
sense of fair and equal treatment of persons in like situations.
133
130. While there is no empirical evidence that smaller competitors individually have
sufficient market power to injure larger rivals, it is theoretically plausible. Furthermore,
certain categories of per se prohibited behavior are sanctionable regardless of the relative
market position of the actor, e.g., section 1 Sherman Act violations involving express price
fixing agreements or conspiracies.
131. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 657-660
(1961).
132. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990) (re-
stating its dictum that Congress designed the antitrust laws to protect "competition, not
competitors").
133. Schwartz, supra note 127, at 1078 (citations omitted).
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Clearly, in cases of concerted refusals to deal under the per se Radiant
Burners standard, it is apparent that the Court will forbid the setting of
arbitrary standards that put coercive pressure on other industry members
to deny an excluded party access to the market.14 This is a classic exam-
ple of where the antitrust law reflects the threshold corrective justice
standard that forbids the unfair use of the market power.
While standard-setting practices, as a rule, are analyzed under a rule of
reason analysis, wherever there is evidence that those standards have
been arbitrarily used for anticompetitive or coercive reasons and the de-
fendant has substantial market power, the per se rule may be applied.
This result is perfectly consistent with the theory of corrective justice
which requires equitable compensation through sanctions whenever a
would-be competitor is financially injured as a result of a coercive abuse
of standard setting practices. Some commentators have proposed "that a
party be regarded as having suffered antitrust injury whenever the loss
incurred is a necessary consequence of an antitrust violation that harms
consumers when it is successful."'35 The principle of corrective justice,
unlike wealth maximizing theories, requires compensation for fellow
competitors if they are victims despite its efficiency effects on others
(consumers)."6 This is a deviation from the Kaldor-Hicks type of eco-
nomic efficiency that would not require compensation for economic inju-
ries creating greater social efficiencies.'37
The principle of corrective justice is deontological in that it requires
compensation in the form of damages commensurate with statutory
remedies if the harmful behavior is unfair, regardless of whether in the
particular case its effect is to promote a welfare-maximizing result.38 For
example, in SCTLA, the Court ruled that a boycott designed to raise
lawyers' fees was per se illegal without making a finding with respect to
the defendant lawyer association's relative market power.19
The Court demonstrates the corrective justice approach to antitrust li-
ability in Silver, holding that where competitors employed an institu-
tional regulatory process in an unfair manner" under totally unjustified
134. See Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 659-60.
135. Roger D. Blair and Jeffery L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1539, 1569 (1989).
136. This deontological feature would sometimes result in Pareto inefficient but tech-
nically fair outcomes. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 66.
137. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-14 (3d ed. 1986).
138. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 66-67.
139. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
434, 436 (1990).
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circumstances" it was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.'4° Correc-
tive justice requires that the standard of compensation be commensurate
with the amount of injury associated with the unfair activity. At this
level, it does not matter from a corrective justice viewpoint whether the
resulting injury involved a group of bad actors or purely individual mal-
feasance.
The threshold standard of "substantial market power" under more re-
cent cases such as Consolidated Metal is a measure of coercive potential
rather than pure economic concentration. It follows that the rule of rea-
son analysis would apply rather than the per se rule where there is little
evidence of the defendant having substantial market power. Without
market power, the standard setter is unlikely to be responsible for a
compensable injury to the plaintiff. The rule of reason analysis, however,
does not exempt behavior from per se liability where the source of the
constraint is fraudulent, coercive, or conspiratorial in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. This result is consistent with the dictates of cor-
rective justice where such liability results in mandatory compensation to
the victim.
Where a standard setter leads a successful boycott, it would not matter,
if consistent with the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice, whether
the boycott leader was a lesser player in terms of market share. If that
boycott leader coercively injured a dominant competitor because of a
conspiratorial agreement, the injury would still constitute a per se viola-
tion of section 1.142 The injured competitor would be due compensation
regardless of his relative market power under a theory of corrective jus-
tice. Therefore, the corrective justice approach explains the results
reached in both per se and rule of reason analysis where evidentiary con-
cerns regarding probable conduct ultimately determine the application of
the rule.
III. MONOPOLIZATION AND WRONGFUL INTENT: THE CASE FOR
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE UNDER SECTION 2 SHERMAN ACT CASES
This Part explores the content and evolution of the law of monopoliza-
tion under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The purpose of this Part is to
examine the extent to which intentional unilateral acts in pursuit of mo-
nopoly power that injure competitors are sanctionable under the anti-
140. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,361, 367 (1963).
141. See Consolidated Metal Prods., Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284,
292 (5th Cir. 1988).
142. See, e.g., Silver, 373 U.S. at 347-49.
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trust laws. This Part is important for building a foundation for evaluating
the viability of corrective justice as an alternative theory to efficiency
based reasons for sanctioning antitrust injuries to competitors, where
those injuries stem from effective monopolization.
A. Establishing & Maintaining Monopoly Power.- An Introduction to the
Role of Anticompetitive Intent
One key feature of monopolization actions under section 2 of the
Sherman Act is that since the Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States,' the rule of reason has governed
these actions.'" While violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act by a
monopolist also violate section 2 in a monopolization suit, the per se
standard is not applicable without a prior determination of the anticom-
petitive effects of the questioned activity.
As the previous Part indicates, in assessing the legality of standard set-
ting and certification programs from an antitrust perspective, the courts
have emphasized the concept of reasonableness. A court may first infer
monopoly power from the defendant's dominant share of the market.
The Supreme Court defined monopoly power in United States v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co.,146 as "the power to control prices and exclude
competition."' Under the dictates of section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
willful acquisition of monopoly power is wrongdoing tantamount to a se-
rious crime: "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine and conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, would be deemed guilty of a felony.' ' 48 In United
States v. Grinnell Corp. , the Supreme Court defined the offense of mo-
nopolization as follows: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
superior product, business acumen, or historical accident."'5 °
Generally, a plaintiff must prove four elements to establish monopoli-
143. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
144. See id. at 60.
145. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F. 2d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1945).
146. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
147. Id. at 391.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
149. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
150. Id. at 570-71.
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zation: (1) monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) anticompetitive
conduct; (3) intent to monopolize; and (4) resulting injury to the plain-
tiff.'
5 1
An important part of this analysis focuses on the role of "reasonable-
ness" under section 2 in evaluating the content of certification standards.
As explained previously in this Article, when courts assess the legality of
specification standards and certification programs, they consistently em-
phasize the concept of reasonableness. The First Circuit in Clamp-All
Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute (CISP) 5 2 restated the role of this
concept in antitrust analysis.
"In evaluating these claims, one must keep in mind the special antitrust
meaning of the terms 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable,' a meaning that
draws its content from the basic objectives of antitrust law's 'rule of rea-
son.'" 53 The rule of reason limits the Sherman Act's literal words to for-
bidding only those arrangements, the anticompetitive consequences of
which outweigh their legitimate business justification. 15 4
Whether developed by a trade association, a government agency, or an
independent laboratory, a standard should be reasonably designed to as-
sure the accomplishment of its goal-be it safety, efficiency of perform-
ance, capacity, or whatever. If there is to be certification, the fees and
requirements for submission of products for testing must also be reason-
able. The certification standards must be reasonable, so that only those
products that are truly deficient will not be certified. The per se line of
cases establish that reasonable avenues for appeal from adverse rulings
by the standard setter (certifier) must be provided. The doctrine of Ra-
diant Burners requires that an objective review of a denial to certify must
be guaranteed for producers whose products fail to meet the specified
standard.' As argued earlier, this makes procedural fairness a central
factor in determining reasonableness.
In section 2 of the Sherman Act, after establishing that a defendant ac-
tually has monopoly power as a threshold issue, the court examines
whether the defendant has "willfully" maintained that power, and
whether the defendant has caused the plaintiff economic injury."' To
151. See Berkey Photo., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272-97 (2d Cir.
1979).
152. 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988).
153. See id. at 486.
154. Id.
155. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961).
156. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377
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prove that a defendant has engaged in an "attempt to monopolize," the
plaintiff must establish the following: "(1) specific intent to control prices
or destroy competition with respect to a part of commerce; (2) predatory
or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplish the unlawful purpose;
(3) dangerous probability of success; and (4) causal antitrust injury." '157
Unilateral refusals to deal are illegal under section 2 when they consti-
tute monopolization or attempts to monopolize. Courts must evaluate
the anticompetitiveness of unilateral refusals to deal under the rule of
reason. A monopolist's actions violate section 2 if they erect "unnatural
barriers" or "unnecessarily exclude actual or potential competition" or
"restrict a free market." ' Section 2 proscribes the use of monopoly
power attained in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another
even when there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second.5 9
The issue of a monopolistic refusal to deal and the market effects of
such a practice has been decided in various situations under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,16 ° the Supreme
Court condemned a newspaper's policy of refusing to sell advertising to
any customer of a nearby radio station.' 6' The Court found that the re-
fusal was an attempt to preserve a monopoly for itself and thus consti-
tuted an illegal attempt to monopolize.62 In Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 163 the Court ruled that an electric power company that re-
fused to sell power or even to transport power to municipalities that had
attempted to establish their own power sources was in violation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.'6 Otter Tail Company had claimed that the
Federal Power Act gave it an implied exemption from the antitrust
(9th Cir. 1983).
157. Id. at 1382.
158. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953).
159. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979).
160. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
161. See id. at 153 (finding that "advertisers wished to supplement their local newspa-
per advertising with local radio advertising but could not afford to discontinue their news-
paper advertising in order to use the radio").
162. See id. at 152 (condemning the newspaper for attempting to monopolize the mar-
ket by coercing advertisers to boycott a nearby radio station, which the Court found vio-
lated the Sherman Act).
163. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
164. See id. at 377 ("The record makes abundantly clear that Otter Tail used its mo-
nopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a competi-
tive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust laws.").
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1666laws.16 The Court completely rejected this claim.16 The Court empha-
sized that where Otter Tail Company had monopoly power and acted to
preserve it, it was guilty of violating the antitrust laws.'67
In Otter Tail, the Court also stated its position that activities that come
under the jurisdiction of federal administrative agencies nevertheless
may be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws, unless Congress ex-
plicitly has stated otherwise. The Supreme Court has restated the lim-
its of implied immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in which a
private standard setting organization is not immune from antitrust liabil-
ity for biasing the standard setting process to the detriment of a market
competitor.'69  The Court found that Noerr immunity depended on the
"context and nature" of the activity.17 1
In Litton Systems Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph,' evidence
of anticompetitive intent was central to the Second Circuit's concurrence
that AT&T had engaged in predatory practices. In this case, AT&T
promoted and enforced interconnection to its network through the
"PCA" device. The court ruled that AT&T's interconnect decision
making was not made in "good faith.' ' 172 Given AT&T's dogged resis-
tance to certification, the court found that those decisions were designed
to stifle and delay competition in the interconnect market. It is clear,
from the voluminous fact finding and stringent adverse judgment in Lit-
ton, that certification was a less restrictive alternative than the PCA re-
quirement. In Litton, the court held that AT&T's bad faith behavior fell
within the "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington and denied it antitrust
immunity.7 3 As the Court emphasized the "nature" and "context" of the
standard setter in Allied Tube, evidence of anticompetitive intent was
165. See id. at 372 ("Otter Tail contends that by reason of the Federal Power Act it is
not subject to antitrust regulation with respect to its refusal to deal. We disagree with that
position.").
166. See id. (finding there is nothing in the Federal Power Act protecting utilities from
antitrust liability when they refuse to deal with municipalities).
167. See id. at 382 (concluding that power companies are not shielded from the
Sherman Act when they abuse their economic power by engaging in anticompetitive prac-
tices).
168. See id. at 373-74 ("[C]ourts must be hesitant to conclude that Congress intended
to override the fundamental national policies embodied in the antitrust laws.").
169. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509-10
(1988) (citing Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965), and Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)).
170. See id. at 499.
171. 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983).
172. Id. at 812-13, 828.
173. See id. at 813-14, 828.
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also crucial in determining AT&T's liability under section 2 of the
Sherman Act for injuries to those competitors with whom it had refused
to deal. The court, in effect, refused to immunize AT&T's bad faith poli-
cies, which unfairly injured potential participants in the interconnect
market.1
74
B. Anticompetitive Intent, Wrongful Attempt, and Conduct Thresholds
for Corrective Justice
Because the Supreme Court defined the offense of monopolization to
include "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power," it
makes anticompetitive intent an essential feature of section 2 action.
In cases involving monopolization, a court may infer intent from evi-
dence that the firm had engaged in one or more exclusionary practices.1
76
For example, in Litton, subjective evidence of AT&T's "bad faith" was
contained in a memorandum in which AT&T conceded that certification
was a superior, achievable alternative to its "PCA.,
177
AT&T's ability to exclude competitors from the market that failed to
meet industry standards demonstrated its market power. This was not
sufficient of itself to constitute grounds for a Section 2 violation without
further corresponding evidence of anticompetitive intent. Rather,
AT&T's market power, combined with a deliberate strategy to resist cer-
tification unfairly, sufficiently established anticompetitive intent.
Not all refusals to deal by monopolists are section 2 violations unless
there is supporting evidence of anticompetitive purpose. In Paschall v.
Kansas City Star Co.,178 the Eighth Circuit held that it was not an antitrust
violation for a newspaper monopoly to begin self-delivery, thereby cut-
ting off all its independent carriers. 179 The court stated:
[W]e emphasize that there is nothing unlawful about the mere
possession of monopoly power. Nor is it unlawful per se for a
174. See id. at 828. In the relatively recent case of Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that motive is insufficient to establish a
section 2 violation under the rule of reason without proof of market power. Such an in-
terpretation limits the scope of corrective justice by invalidating unfair motivation for
competitive injury as sufficient grounds for compensation even under a rule of reason
analysis. The case is a significant victory for efficiency based economic formalism in the
context of section 2 monopolization cases.
175. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2).
176. See Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 395-402 (1905).
177. See Litton, 700 F.2d at 795.
178. 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984).
179. See id. at 704 ("In this case appellees have failed to prove that any anticompeti-
tive effects that might result from Star Co.'s vertical integration and refusal to deal are un-
reasonable.").
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monopolist to unilaterally refuse to deal with a former distribu-
tor or to vertically integrate. However, a monopolist may be
subject to antitrust liability if it misuses its monopoly power to
accomplish a vertical integration and a refusal to deal that re-
sults in unreasonable anticompetitive effects'"°
Therefore, the Paschall court reiterated the role of the rule of reason
in determining whether valid business justification exists for a monopo-
list's actions.
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,181 the Supreme
Court gave full recognition to the Paschall doctrine on intent. In Aspen
Skiing, the Court returned to the debate over the intent requirement in
section 2, concluding that in monopolization cases "evidence of intent is
merely relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly
characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive.""82 The Court de-
cided in Aspen Skiing that a company that has monopoly power may ref-
use to deal with a competitor in some manner that does not violate sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act if a valid business reason exists. 83 While
Aspen Skiing held that a unilateral refusal to deal did violate section 2 of
the Sherman Act, it only did so because it was unreasonable and the
plaintiff provided evidence of anticompetitive intent. In this case, the re-
fusal to deal was coupled with significant market power in a manner that
validated the inference of anticompetitive intent because that refusal
created no efficiencies.
In Trans World Airlines v. American Coupon Exchange,184 a federal
district court upheld an airline's decision to terminate agencies that
brokered discount flyer coupons, ruling that the behavior was "reason-
able" to the extent the action sought to enforce the airlines tariffs.' The
rule of reason doctrine as expressed in Aspen, Paschall, and TWA allows
monopolists to optimize business relationships for legitimate business
reasons, as long as those terminations are reasonable and promote com-
petitive results. In all cases, however, the court determines "reasonable-
ness" by both the propriety of the proffered business rationale and the
substantive nature of the act.
Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the promulgation of certification
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
182. Id. at 602.
183. See id. at 604.
184. 682 F. Supp. 1476 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd, 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990).
185. See id. at 1486 (determining that TWA's actions were "not unreasonable to the
extent that they are merely an effort at enforcement of their tariffs").
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standards that economically injure producers of nonconforming products
is also subject to the rule of reason analysis. In Eliason Corp. v. National
Sanitation Foundation,186 the Sixth Circuit stated that "a monopolist that
achieves that status because of superior product, business acumen, or his-
torical accident" could not be faulted187 and that the National Sanitation
Foundation held a deserved position of market importance because of its
excellent certification policies. 8' According to the court, "[w]here the
alleged boycott arises from standard making or even industry self-
regulation, the plaintiff must show that either it was barred from obtain-
ing approval of its products on a discriminatory basis from its competi-
tors, or that the conduct as a whole was manifestly anticompetitive and
unreasonable., 189 In essence, Eliason stands for the proposition that
where certification standards provide market benefits that are fairly con-
ducive to competition and that are non-discriminatory, injury to specific
competitors cannot constitute "unreasonable" behavior under section 2
analysis.
In this Article, the exposition of the role of anticompetitive intent is
important beyond its threshold requirement status for section 2 viola-
tions under the Grinnell doctrine. This is because the intentional viola-
tion of antitrust laws effects the baseline moral criterion that regulates
market behavior. Such coercive or unscrupulous use of market superi-
ority constitutes conduct contrary to accepted norms of competitive be-
havior. The conduct requirement for proving anticompetitive intent in
attempting to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act establishes
a standard for liability. It also satisfies conditions for sufficiently wrong-
ful behavior to justify compensation under the principle of corrective jus-
tice when that conduct injures competitors.
The attempt clause of section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids acts by
monopolists that are intentionally designed to affect monopolization.
Wrongful conduct in this context is evidence of specific intent where the
conduct is by definition anticompetitive. For example, in cases where
one could find section 1 per se liability because of conspiratorial behav-
ior, one could also draw the inference of an attempt to monopolize under
section 2.190 Strong arguments for relaxing the strict evidentiary require-
186. 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980).
187. Id. at 131 n.8.
188. See id. at 128.
189. Id. at 129.
190. Several cases from the Ninth Circuit have broadened the scope of the attempted
monopolization offense to include a virtually per se emphasis on categories of disfavored
behavior regardless of the relative market power of the defendant. See Greyhound Coin-
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ments for proving the defendant's market power can be made where it is
clear that his or her conduct was harmful, grossly unfair or predatory in
nature. In such cases, it is reasonable to conclude that actors engage in
conduct that is morally noxious and normally inimical to competition for
anticompetitive reasons. Areeda and Turner wrote in their classic trea-
tise on antitrust:
[W]e suggest that the attempt clause of section 2 might rea-
sonably be applied, without proof of significant market position,
to conduct (1) which is totally unrelated to competition on the
merits that is, lacking any plausible claim to redeeming virtue;
(2) which clearly implies the presence or prospect of some de-
gree of durable market power as, for example, conduct not
likely to be rationally undertaken by a firm without such power
or the hope of attaining it through the challenged conduct; and
(3) which has potentially significant exclusionary effects in the
generality of cases- in that there is a clear and direct causal
connection between the conduct and the power."'
This result is particularly troublesome for an efficiency-oriented for-
malist who would insist that when unfair or predatory conduct is effi-
ciency-creating or welfare-maximizing the courts should never sanction
it. Blind faith that only those firms possessing demonstrable market
power can affect antitrust injury ignores the difficulty of resolving dis-
putes about contested markets. In many cases, proof of the disfavored
conduct is easy, while establishing its overall effect on the market is im-
possible. In such cases, the rule of reason approach is obviously inap-
propriate. Only the per se rule will allow a just mandate for compensa-
tion to be issued. At worst, such economic formalism deliberately
ignores the tradition of per se condemnation of various types of disfa-
puter Corp., Inc. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977); Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964). But see Daniel J. Gifford, The Role of the
Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1021 (1986). Professor Gifford criticizes the line of Ninth Circuit cases that follow
Lessig as overly expansive. Those cases utilized a "double inference" of anticompetitive
intent relying heavily on the qualitative nature of the defendant's conduct, as well as dis-
pensed with the requirements of first proving "dangerous probability of success" and
"relevant market" in order to establish the prima facie case. In effect, the Ninth Circuit's
decisions made proof of the defendant's market power in the monopolization context sec-
ondary to its appraisal of the appropriateness of the defendant's conduct. These results
are perfectly consistent with the rationale favoring corrective justice remedies where the
relevant market position of the defendant is indeterminate but the plaintiff's harm
stemmed from easily provable wrongful behavior. However, in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v..
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 453-54 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court has overruled the Lessig
line of cases where the primary emphasis of evidentiary presumption was put on the moral
appropriateness of conduct without proof of market power held by the defendant.
191. See AREEDA & HOVEKAMP, supra note 16, at 352.
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vored anticompetitive conduct in order to promote a pro-business
agenda. In either case, courts often ignore fundamental concerns about
justice and fairness in market mechanisms by this preoccupation with
economic formalism.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE TO
TIE-IN CASES
A. The Classic Tie-In Case: International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States
The general prohibition of coercive activity that is compatible with a
scheme of corrective justice is also relevant to the antitrust analysis of
tying arrangements. In International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) v.
United States, 92 the Supreme Court rejected the use of specification stan-
dards as a ruse for implementing an impermissible tying arrangement. 93
In IBM, the Court condemned an arrangement that tied paper computer
cards manufactured exclusively by IBM to the lease of its computer ma-
chines.114 The Court held that the arrangement constituted a violation of
section 3 of the Clayton Act, which forbids "tying clauses" that tend to
lessen competition.'9 IBM argued that the restrictive clause served to
protect its good will by preventing the use of unsuitable cards that would
interfere with the successful performance of its machines. 96 The Court
rejected this argument:
[IBM] is not prevented from proclaiming the virtues of its own
cards or warning against the danger of using, in its machines,
cards which do not conform to the necessary specifications, or
even making its leases conditional upon the use of cards which
conform to them. For ought that appears such measures would
protect its good will, without creation of monopoly or resort to
suppression of competition.97
The Court also noted, "[i]t affirmatively appears, by stipulation, that
others are capable of manufacturing cards suitable for use in the appel-
lant's machine."'99  Thus, whenever such specification standards are
adopted, it is clear that no illegal tying arrangement is presented unless
192. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
193. See id. at 139.
194. See id. at 139-40.
195. See id. at 139.
196. See id. at 138-39.
197. Id. at 139-40.
198. Id. at 139.
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the seller actually forces the buyer to take an unwanted product as a pre-
condition for attaining the needed tied product.
At least five elements are required to make out a tying violation: (1)
separate tied and tying products; (2) actual coercion; (3) sufficient eco-
nomic power in the tying product market; (4) anticompetitive effect in
the tied product market; and (5) a substantial amount of interstate com-
merce in the tied product market.' 99 The coercive element of the lever-
aging behavior violates fundamental preconditions for free competitive
exchange.
B. The Role of Economic Coercion in Tie-In Disputes: The Case for
Corrective Justice
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde the Court said
that tying arrangements should be condemned when the defendant has
sufficient market power "to force a purchaser to do something he would
not do in a competitive market. 20' This condition is an operative defini-
tion of "coercion" in the antitrust context. While in this case the Court
upheld an apparent non-coercive tying arrangement, the dictum forbid-
ding coercion is totally compatible with the principles of corrective jus-
tice. Where a private plaintiff is injured by being forced to purchase a
tied package, the damages are equal to the "monopoly overcharge"; that
is, the difference between the amount paid for the tied packet and the
price if no purchase had been made or if a competitive substitute was
found. Subjecting the guilty party to treble damages under the Sherman
Act compensates for the monopoly overcharge price. This trebling effect
is also consistent with corrective justice because the antitrust statute es-
tablishes the actual baseline standard of equitable distribution.2° These
private damages serve to satisfy the compensatory requirements of cor-
rective justice while reinforcing our societal interests in deterring anti-
competitive and coercive conduct.
Prohibiting coercion is a baseline behavioral criterion under a theory
of corrective justice. Corrective justice requires an equitable resolution
of disputes alleging economic coercion. For example, cartel members of-
ten use concerted refusals to deal when pressuring non-members to con-
form to pricing or output strategy. Coercive actions that injure competi-
199. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (12th Cir. 1980) (holding that
where there is no coercion, there is no tie-in); W.H. Brady Co. v. Lem Prods., Inc., 659 F.
Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Il. 1987).
200. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
201. Id. at 13.
202. See generally Lande, supra note 28.
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tors violate the element of free choice in economic decision-making that
is necessary for a free and competitive marketplace to survive. At this
level, standard welfare economic analysis of antitrust rules differs sub-
stantially from corrective justice theories. General economic welfare
analysis seeks to justify the elimination of monopoly or anticompetitive
practices because of overall adverse effect on competition and indirect
harm to consumers. Whenever such results are inefficient, welfare the-
ory argues for the elimination of monopolistic practices. For example,
monopoly under standard welfare analysis leads to higher prices that
subsequently leads to lower consumer welfare. Standard welfare analysis
provides the strongest efficiency-based objection to monopoly. A theory
of corrective justice, however, would require compensation for any
harms stemming from monopolistic practices because the willful exercise
of such advantages is unfair and inimical to competition. The corrective
justice theory of compensation for antitrust injury recognizes both the
economic harm of monopoly-based inefficiency and the institutional
harm of unfair trade practices. By compensating individuals for losses
due to unfair market practices, corrective justice prevents final transfers
of wealth that promote monopoly power. The effect of the corrective
justice norm is to promote substantive fairness, market efficiency, and
free competition.
C. New Possibilities for Corrective Justice in Tie-In Doctrine: Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
Apparently, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 203
the Court has arrested the slide toward a total efficiency based "Chicago-
School" approach to the law of tying. Plaintiffs in Kodak, independent
service organizations (ISOs) that repaired and maintained Kodak copy-
ing and micrographic equipment, alleged that Kodak violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully tying the sale of service to the
sale of replacement parts and by monopolizing and attempting to mo-
nopolize the service market for Kodak equipment.2 4 According to the
ISOs, after obtaining control over the supply of Kodak brand replace-
ment parts-the only brand that would work with its equipment-Kodak
refused to sell parts to equipment owners who employed the ISOs, effec-
tively driving ISOs from the market. The district court granted Kodak
summary judgment on both counts of the complaint.2°6 The Court of
203. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
204. See id. at 456.
205. See id. at 458.
206. See id. at 459; see also Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that despite Kodak's
conceded lack of power in the primary equipment markets, the possibil-
ity of "market imperfections" raised a factual question as to whether
Kodak possessed sufficient power in replacement parts to force some
customers to purchase service from Kodak.2°7
Before both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, Kodak argued
that the dictates of neoclassical price theory, coupled with the concession
that Kodak's primary equipment market was competitive, precluded it
from possessing power in the after-market for Kodak parts. 8 Neoclassi-
cal economic theory of the "Chicago School" variety suggests that
equipment buyers would regard a rise in the price of parts as an increase
in the overall price of the equipment; in Kodak's concededly competitive
equipment market, a unilateral price increase would have led to lost
revenues. Because "market power" when exercised would have reduced
its profitability, Kodak argued that "market power" in this instance
should not be considered market power at all. Thus, according to the
dictates of economic theory, Kodak claimed that it could not have vio-
lated the antitrust laws.0 9
The Kodak Court indicated that while Kodak's argument was "intui-
tively appealing," price theory "may not accurately explain the behavior
of primary and derivative markets for complex durable goods. 210 In such
markets, said the Court, "difficult and costly" information gaps and "high
switching costs" can confer market power on sellers with relatively low
market shares.21' The Court emphasized how switching costs and asym-
metric gaps in buyer information-two types of market failure inconsis-
tent with "Chicago School" assumptions regarding perfect information-
necessitated further factual inquiry into the anti-competitive effects of
Kodak's policies on plaintiff ISOs.
12
The Court's refusal to uphold summary judgment raises the possibility
that Kodak intended to drive the ISOs from the market by implementing
policies that both disadvantaged them as competitors and also disadvan-
taged consumers due to market imperfections. Information gaps and
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402, at 60,210, 60,214 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 613
(9th Cir. 1990), affd, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
207. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 616-18 (9th Cir.
1990), affd. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
208. See id. at 616.
209. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465-66. Judge Bork, among others, strongly agreed with
Kodak's argument. See BORK, supra note 17, at 436-38.
210. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473.
211. See id. at 473-78.
212. See id.
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high switching costs were so substantially unfair that efficiency-based jus-
tifications would no longer be recognized as "a matter of law." Some
commentators have construed Kodak as a jurisprudential milestone in its
retreat from conventional "Chicago School" reasoning.213 In this deci-
sion, a more expansive type of economic reasoning than the traditional
Pareto allocative efficiency-based "Chicago School" approach raises the
possibility of providing compensatory antitrust remedies for aggrieved
plaintiffs in a manner more consistent with the dictates of corrective jus-
tice.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article provides an alternative philosophical explanation for the
evolution of the conduct and compensation standards of the federal anti-
trust laws. The classical idea of corrective justice is more compatible
with modern antitrust standards and remedies than conventional welfare
economic analysis. At present, however, efficiency-based reasoning pro-
vides the predominant paradigm in antitrust analysis. Corrective justice
promotes results that emphasize justice to individuals. Most importantly,
corrective justice requires compensation and legal sanction whenever un-
fair and coercive business practices result in injuries to competitors, re-
gardless of benefits to third parties. The examples drawn from trade as-
sociation activities involving standards and certification in the section 1
and section 2 unilateral refusals to deal contexts are illustrative of the vi-
ability of corrective justice as a sound alternative perspective for existing
antitrust injury, conduct, and compensation requirements. In sum, the
principle of corrective justice explains how the law requires compensa-
tion for antitrust injuries even when those "wrongful acts" serve to create
efficient or welfare maximizing outcomes in a particular case. This tenet
is, of course, contrary to predominant efficiency-based norms.
While antitrust prohibitions are not ends in themselves, these laws re-
213. The potentially devastating effects of Kodak on the "Chicago school's" meth-
odological hold on contemporary anti-trust jurisprudence has generated significant aca-
demic comment. See, e.g., Lawrence T. Festa, III, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Empire?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
619, 620 (1993); see also Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Infor-
mation Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193, 193
(1993); but see Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services,
Inc.: Information Failure As Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1994) (where Prof.
Fox argues that Kodak is essentially a case about powerful firms abusing competitors and
subverting the competitive process). She argues the Court's opinion is strategically
cloaked in the language of information-cost economics, and consumer exploitation analy-
sis. She writes: "[I]n Kodak, a sufficient number of Supreme Court Justices simply refused
to jettison the legitimacy and process values of antitrust." Id. at 761.
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flect moral norms requiring just compensation for damages sustained by
economic agents unfairly or coercively injured by the devices of their
competitors. The simple maxim that the legislature designed antitrust
laws to protect competition and not competitors is at best misleading. A
narrow welfare economic notion of competition defined exclusively by
efficiency concerns and measured by market position cannot explain the
per se doctrine that forbids conspiratorial and coercive actions or at-
tempts regardless of potential economic benefits. A corrective justice
approach to antitrust injury promotes a generous notion of competition
based on fairness, freedom, and process equity for every agent in the
marketplace. Therefore, corrective justice provides a profoundly richer
explanation of our national antitrust laws and its sanctions than those
theories exclusively promoting welfare economic efficiency.
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